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In re Puget Sound Power and Light Company:
Eminent Domain by Corporations Reevaluated
In the case of In re Puget Sound Power and Light Co.,' the
Washington Court of Appeals rejected the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard of judicial review for determinations of public
use' and necessity8 by private corporations in eminent domain
proceedings.' Recognizing that deferential judicial review is
1. 28 Wash. App. 615, 625 P.2d 723 (1981), appeal denied, 95 Wash. 2d 1026 (1981).
2. Eminent domain is the sovereign power to condemn private property for a public
use. 1 NICHOLS, EMIENr DOMAIN § 1.11 (rev. 3d ed. 1981). Accordingly, for a valid exer-
cise of eminent domain authority, the contemplated use for which the acquisition is
sought must be public. The Washington statute expressly requires the public use ele-
ment in all eminent domain proceedings. See infra notes 4,9. Additionally, the Washing-
ton constitution makes the public use of a proposed acquisition a judicial question.
WASH. CoNsT. art. I, § 16, amend. 9. See infra note 34.
3. The necessity issue arises in a variety of contexts in eminent domain proceedings.
The two broad necessity issues that most frequently arise are the necessity of the project
and the necessity of the particular property. When the necessity of the project is chal-
lenged, Washington courts examine the relationship between the public interest and the
proposed project, but tend to dilute the definition of necessity to accommodate projects
that are not absolutely or immediately essential for the public interest. See, e.g., State v.
Superior Court, 70 Wash. 2d 630, 424 P.2d 913 (1967) (reasonable public need for mono-
rail satisfies requirement of necessity); Steilacoom v. Thompson, 69 Wash. 2d 705, 419
P.2d 989 (1966) (condemnation for sewer necessary despite fact that danger of contami-
nation uncertain); City of Tacoma v. Welcker, 65 Wash. 2d 677, 399 P.2d 330 (1965)
(immediate need not required for project to protect city's water supply from
contamination).
When the necessity of the particular property is an issue, courts examine the rela-
tionship between the project and the condemnee's land. For example, the issue in Puget
was whether the Jauch property was necessary for the project contemplated by Puget
Sound Power and Light (PPL) in light of another alternative. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 10-16. The necessity of the particular property may also be challenged on the
basis that the condemnor seeks an excessive amount. See generally 1 NICHOLS, EMINENT
DOMAIN § 4.11 (rev. 3d ed. 1981).
4. In King County v. Farr, 7 Wash. App. 600, 501 P.2d 612 (1972), the Washington
Court of Appeals described the general procedure followed in all condemnations: "A con-
demnation action consists of three phases: (1) adjudication of public use and necessity,
(2) determination of damages to be awarded to the owner and (3) payment of the
amount of the award and entry into possession." Id. at 602, 501 P.2d at 615. This note
considers only the first phase of the proceedings in depth. Condemnors initiate this
phase by filing a condemnation petition in superior court. See infra note 11.
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inappropriate when the condemnor is a private entity, the court
held that due process requires a private condemnor to prove
public use and necessity by a preponderance of the evidence."
Although the court correctly shifted the burden of proof to the
condemnor, the court could have grounded its decision in the
Washington procedural statute governing corporate condemna-
tion6 and avoided the constitutional question. Despite mislead-
ing case law,7 the wording of the corporate condemnation stat-
ute" differs significantly from statutes governing public entities.,
The court's role in adjudicating public use and necessity is set out in separate stat-
utes for each entity authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain. WASH. REV.
CODE § 8.20.070 (1981) governs the trial court's role in corporate eminent domain
proceedings.
Adjudication of public use or private way of necessity. At the time and place
appointed for hearing said petition, or to which the same may have been
adjourned, if the court or judge thereof shall have satisfactory proof that all
parties interested in the land, real estate, premises, or other property described
in said petition, have been duly served with said notice as above prescribed,
and shall be further satisfied by competent proof that the contemplated use for
which the land, real estate, premises or other property sought to be appropri-
ated is really a public use, or is for a private use for a private way of necessity,
and that the public interest requires the prosecution of such enterprise, or the
private use is, for a private way of necessity, and that the land, real estate,
premises or other property sought to be appropriated are required and neces-
sary for the purposes of such enterprise, the court or judge thereof may make
an order, to be recorded in the minutes of said court, directing that a jury be
summoned, or called, in the manner provided by law, to ascertain the compen-
sation which shall be made for the land, real estate, premises or other property
sought to be appropriated, unless a jury be waived as in other civil cases in
courts of record, in the manner prescribed by law.
5. Puget, 28 Wash. App. at 619-20, 625 P.2d at 725.
6. WASH. REV. CODE § 8.20.070 (1981). See supra note 4.
7. See infra notes 54-66 and accompanying text.
8. See supra note 4.
9. WASH, REV. CODE § 8.04.070 (1981) (eminent domain by state).
Hearing-Order adjudicating public use. At the time and place appointed
for hearing the petition.... if the court ... is.. . satisfied by competent proof
that the contemplated use for which the lands ... are sought to be appropri-
ated is really necessary for the public use of the state, it shall make and enter
an order ... adjudicating that the contemplated use for which the lands ... are
sought to be appropriated is really a public use of the state.
WASH. REV. CODE § 8.08.040 (1981) (eminent domain by counties).
Hearing-Order adjudicating public use. At the time and place appointed
for hearing said petition .... if the court or judge thereof ... shall be . ..
satisfied by competent proof that the contemplated use for which the lands...
sought to be appropriated is a public use of the county, the court or judge
thereof may make and enter an order adjudicating that the contemplated use
is really a public use of the county ....
WASH. REV. CODE § 8.12.090 (1981) (eminent domain by cities).
Waiver of jury-Adjudication of public use-Procedure. . . .Whenever an
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Courts should interpret the statute for corporations to require
strict judicial supervision of the eminent domain actions of pri-
vate entities.
Puget Sound Power and Light Company (PPL), a private
utility,10 attempted to purchase an easement for an electrical
transmission line across Kenneth and Carolyn Jauch's property.
When the Jauchs refused to sell, PPL filed a condemnation peti-
tion" in superior court pursuant to the statute for corporate
eminent domain.' 2 At the hearing," the Jauchs argued that PPL
could place the new power lines across the road where PPL
already had franchise rights." PPL contended the condemna-
tion was necessary because of safety factors, engineering prac-
tices, and cost."5 After inspecting both sites, the trial court
found that PPL's determination of public use and necessity was
attempt is made to take private property, for a use alleged to be public under
authority of this chapter, the question whether the contemplated use be really
public shall be a judicial question and shall be determined as such by the court
before inquiry is had into the question of compensation to be made.
WAs H. REV. CODE § 8.16.050 (1981) (eminent domain by school districts).
Hearing-Finding of necessity-Setting for trial. At the time and place
appointed for the hearing of such petition, . . . if the court ... shall ... find
that such real estate sought to be taken is required and necessary for the pur-
poses of a schoolhouse site, ... the court shall make an order reciting such
findings ....
10. Although privately financed, PPL is an electric company as defined by WASH.
REV. CODE § 80.04.010 (1981). As such, it is granted eminent domain authority by WASH.
REV. CODE § 80.32.060 (1981). Public service corporations are subject to regulation by the
state through the Utilities and Transportation Commission, but the Commission has no
supervisory power over corporate eminent domain actions.
11. WASH. REV. CODE § 8.20.010 (1981) sets out the contents required in a petition
for condemnation when the condemnor is a private corporation. The property sought
must be described with reasonable certainty, the interested parties must be identified;
and the purpose for the acquisition must be set forth. WASH. REV. CODE § 8.20.070 (1981)
describes the trial court's role once the proceeding has been initiated by the condemnor's
petition. See supra note 4.
12. See supra note 4.
13. The appellate courts call the proceeding a public use and necessity hearing more
often than a trial. The hearing precedes a jury trial on the issue of compensation which
is the second phase of the condemnation proceedings. See supra note 4.
14. PPL had franchise rights across the road from the Jauch property pursuant to
WASH. REV. CODE § 80.32.010 (1981).
15. PPL wished to place a transmission pole for power lines on the Jauch property
as part of a project to increase the power supply in the area. PPL experts claimed the
existing pole across the street was not adequate to support the new transmission lines.
PPL preferred using the Jauch property because it would eliminate a potentially danger-
ous angle in the lines. Furthermore, PPL claimed that soil studies would be required to
determine whether the soil across the road could support a new pole, thereby increasing
the cost of the project. Brief for Respondent at 7-11, Puget, 28 Wash. App. 615, 625 P.2d
723 (1981).
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not arbitrary and capricious's and entered a condemnation
decree in favor of the utility. The Jauchs appealed, contending
that the trial court erroneously applied the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard of review to PPL's determination of necessity.
The Washington Court of Appeals1 7 recognized that courts
traditionally review a determination of necessity deferentially
because of the legislative nature of the determination."8 Courts
have uniformly characterized condemnation decisions as legisla-
tive because eminent domain is an inherent sovereign power's
limited only by express constitutional provisions.20 Additionally,
a condemnor is better qualified than a court to make technical
decisions regarding the necessity and location of a public proj-
ect. Although the doctrine of separation of powers limits judicial
interference with legislative functions, 21 due process requires
that legislative acts be rationally related to a legitimate public
purpose.2 2 Deferential review ensures, without encroaching on
16. An objection to the standard of review was not raised in the trial court proceed-
ing. The Jauchs argued that PPL's choice of their property was arbitrary and capricious.
Id. at 16.
17. The Washington Supreme Court denied PPL's petition for review. In re Puget
Sound Power & Light, 95 Wash. 2d 1026 (1981).
18. Puget, 28 Wash. App. at 618, 625 P.2d at 725.
19. Most courts endorse the theory that eminent domain is an inherent attribute of
sovereignty. See, e.g., State v. King County, 74 Wash. 2d 673, 675, 446 P.2d 193, 195
(1968); City of Tacoma v. Welcker, 65 Wash. 2d 677, 683, 399 P.2d 330, 334 (1965); 1
NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.14(2) (rev. 3d ed. 1981).
Other courts subscribe to the theory that the state ultimately owns all property
within its boundaries. According to this theory, individuals hold title subject to the
state's reserved right to exercise its ownership. 1 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.13 (rev.
3d ed. 1981).
20. As an inherent attribute of sovereignty, the power of eminent domain is not
dependent upon a constitutional grant; however, constitutional provisions limit the
potentially absolute power. Both the federal and state constitutions contain constraints
which prohibit taking private property for a public use without just compensation. U.S.
CONST. amend. V; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16, amend. 9. See also supra note 2.
In addition, eminent domain must be exercised within the constraints imposed by
due process. U.S. CONsT. amend. V, XIV, § 1; WASH. CONsT. art. I, § 3. For a discussion
of the substantive implications of due process in eminent domain proceedings, see infra
notes 21-23 and accompanying text. Procedural due process also affects condemnations.
See infra text accompanying notes 38-48.
21. The doctrine of separation of powers requires courts to defer to legislative acts.
In re Salary of Juvenile Director, 87 Wash. 2d 232, 237, 552 P.2d 163, 170 (1976).
22. For a discussion of substantive due process as a source of judicial power to
review legislative decisions in eminent domain proceedings, see Comment, Abusive Exer-
cises of the Power of Eminent Domain: Taking a Look at What the Taker Took, 44
WASH. L. Rlv. 200, 220-24 (1968). See also 1 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 4.9 (rev. 3d ed.
1981).
The requirement of due process of law relates to the substance of any leg-
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legislative prerogatives, that legislative decisions meet minimum
standards of substantive due process. 23
A private corporation is not a legislative decisionmaker enti-
tled to judicial deference. While most authorities conclude that a
legislative delegation of eminent domain power includes a grant
of discretion to determine the necessity of the taking,"' under
the Puget court's analysis, the legislative source of power does
not determine the character of the grantee's decision. The Puget
court looked behind the decision's traditional legislative label
and examined the character of the decisionmaker. Unlike a pri-
vate corporation, the state or public condemnor exercises discre-
tion as a public representative 5 in condemning land for a public
project. Theoretically, public officials have no self interest in the
ultimate governmental decision reached. In addition, the ballot
box imposes political constraints on public decisionmakers.
Washington's Open Public Meetings Act26 further mandates that
islative enactment as well as to the procedure and forms adopted for carrying
it into effect.
When applied to substantive rights it is interpreted to mean that the gov-
ernment does not have the legal power to deprive a person of property by an
act that has no reasonable relation to any proper governmental purpose, or
which is so far beyond the necessity of the case as to constitute an arbitrary
exercise of governmental power.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
23. Judicial review is a proper check on legislative functions in a system of checks
and balances. Judicial authority to declare legislative acts unconstitutional is an example
of direct control of one branch of government over another. W. Gw'YN, THE MEANING OF
SEPARATION OF POWESs 110 (1965).
24. 1 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 3.1(2) (rev. 3d ed. 1981).
25. The Puget court recognized that a legislative decision contemplates public input
in the decisionmaking process:
A governmental body exercising the power of eminent domain is required,
either by the nature of the legislative process or by express statutory directive,
to make its decision in a public forum where objections by affected citizens
may be heard. The superior court adjudicating the public use and necessity of
a governmental entity's eminent domain decision therefore has the benefit of
both agency expertise and public discussion. Thus, the arbitrary and capricious
standard of review is justifiable.
Puget, 28 Wash. App. at 619, 625 P.2d at 725.
26. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30.030 (1981) requires: "All meetings of the governing
body of a public agency shall be open and public and all persons shall be permitted to
attend any meeting of the governing body of a public agency, except as otherwise pro-
vided in this chapter." The policy of the Open Public Meetings Act is expressly stated in
WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30.010 (1981).
Legislative declaration. The legislature finds and declares that all public
commissions, boards, councils, committees, subcommittees, departments, divi-
sions, offices, and all other public agencies of this state and subdivisions
thereof exist to aid in the conduct of the people's business. It is the intent of
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meetings of the governing body of any public agency be open to
public attendance. These safeguards justify deferential review of
the eminent domain decisions of public entities.
PPL's decisionmakers, on the other hand, represent the
interests of the corporation. They are not required to be respon-
sive to the public's concerns during the decisionmaking pro-
cess, 7 nor have they been accountable to the public for their
condemnation decisions through the political process. Judicial
review, therefore, is the only safeguard against abusive exercises
of eminent domain power when the condemnor is a private
corporation.
When judicial review is the only safeguard against oppres-
sive exercises of eminent domain power, the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard of review is inappropriate. The arbitrary and
capricious standard places the burden of proof on the con-
demnee.' Without proof of actual or constructive fraud in the
condemnor's determination of necessity, the standard precludes
a court from denying a condemnation petition.'9 The con-
demnor's decision is, therefore, conclusive in most cases.30
this chapter that their actions be taken openly and that their deliberations be
conducted openly.
The people of this state do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies
which serve them. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public
servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is
not good for them to know. The people insist on remaining informed so that
they may retain control over the instruments they have created.
This statute does not apply to private corporations. As the Puget court noted, PPL's
decision to exercise its power of eminent domain was made in private. Puget, 28 Wash.
App. at 619, 625 P.2d at 725.
27. The Puget court was concerned with the lack of public involvement in the deci-
sionmaking process.
Conversely, when a public service corporation exercises its eminent
domain powers, it is not required to hold any hearings, or to provide any
means for public involvement prior to the commencement of judicial proceed-
ings. Thus, the basis for the "arbitrary and capricious" standard-the exis-
tence of a legislative process-is not present.
Puget, 28 Wash. App. at 619, 625 P.2d at 725.
28. Hove v. Port of Seattle, 80 Wash. 2d 392, 398, 495 P.2d 327, 331 (1972) (con-
demnee has burden of showing willful and unreasoned action amounting to actual or
constructive fraud); Town of Medical Lake v. Brown, 63 Wash. 2d 41, 45, 385 P.2d 387,
389 (1963) (condemnee claiming lack of necessity for taking her land for construction of
sewage lagoon has burden of proving that town council's determination of necessity was
fraudulent).
29. A court will defer to the discretion of the condemnor even when there are other
alternatives and the reviewing court disagrees with the condemnor's choice. Miller v.
City of Tacoma, 61 Wash. 2d 374, 390, 378 P.2d 464, 474 (1963).
30. Washington courts only occasionally find arbitrary and capricious conduct
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In Puget, for example, the Jauchs raised a serious question
about the necessity of condemning their property"1 hut were
unable to overcome the strong presumption in favor of PPL pro-
vided by the deferential standard. Effective judicial review pro-
tecting landowners against unnecessary condemnation, is pre-
vented by this strong presumption in favor of the condemnor.
In addition, arbitrary and capricious review is inappropriate
because limited judicial review presumes the existence of a
record for the trial court to review." When a public entity exer-
cises eminent domain power, a legislative or administrative pro-
ceeding 3 generally precedes the superior court hearing. Corpo-
amounting to constructive fraud. See, e.g., King County v. Theilman, 59 Wash. 2d 586,
369 P.2d 503 (1962). In Theilman, there was evidence that the county instituted con-
demnation proceedings at the request of a private developer who was unsuccessful in his
own attempt to purchase property from the condemnee. Since the county had no funds
set aside to build the road, and since there was evidence that the developer had agreed
to pay the compensation, the court found that the action of the Board of County Com-
missioners was sufficiently arbitrary and capricious to amount to constructive fraud.
31. The Jauchs claimed that PPL's choice of their property was based on the mis-
taken belief that PPL had franchise rights over it. PPL's evidence, the Jauchs claimed,
was merely an after-the-fact rationalization for its decision. The Jauchs also introduced
evidence that the soil across the road was suitable for a new pole, that it was common
practice for PPL to construct lines at an angle, and that the increase in cost to replace
the old pole was insignificant. Brief for Appellant at 17-22, Puget, 28 Wash. App. 615,
625 P.2d 723 (1981).
32. The Puget court noted in a footnote that judicial review of an administrative or
legislative act for arbitrary and capricious conduct generally means that the court
restricts itself to the record before the agency. Id. at 618 n.2, 625 P.2d at 725 n.2.
33. As the Puget court noted, a city must condemn by ordinance. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 8.12.040 (1981) requires: "When the corporate authorities of any such city shall desire
to condemn land or any other property, or damage the same, for any purpose authorized
by this chapter, such city shall provide therefor by ordinance."
Similarly, the necessity for a condemnation is a legislative question when a county
exercises its delegated eminent domain authority. WASH. REV. CODE § 8.08.010 (1981)
authorizes counties to condemn land whenever the board of county commissioners deems
it necessary for county purposes to acquire such land.
Any determination of necessity made by a governmental entity is arguably legisla-
tive. See Joiner v. City of Dallas, 380 F. Supp. 754 (N.D. Tex.), afl'd mem., 419 U.S. 1042
(1974). In Joiner, the condemnees claimed that the city of Dallas acted administratively
rather than legislatively, and therefore, the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment guaranteed them a right to participate in the decisionmaking process. The court
held that,
[t]he decision to appropriate private property is not, however, a minor ministe-
rial function. The power of eminent domain, whether exercised by the state
legislature or a municipal corporation, is a unique sovereign right fundamental
to the performance of governmental responsibilities. This power is essentially
and fundamentally legislative, and its character cannot be changed by switch-
ing the labels under which it is pursued.
Id. at 771.
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rate condemnors, on the other hand, make their decisions
privately and are not required to compile a record for review. In
a private condemnation, the trial court functions as a fact-
finder, considering evidence for and against condemnation, and
cannot properly be characterized as a reviewing body.
Because a private corporation is not a legislative deci-
sionmaker, and because there is no proceeding prior to superior
court action, limited judicial review is not justified. A private
condemnor should be required to prove public use 4 and neces-
sity by a preponderance of the evidence.
In Puget, the trial court received evidence for and against
condemnation of the Jauch property. Both sides presented
expert testimony.35 The trial judge inspected the Jauch property
and the alternative site.86 Equipped with this evidence, the trial
34. Despite a constitutional mandate making public use a judicial question, see
supra note 2, the Washington courts also tend to defer to the condemnor's decision
regarding public use. See, e.g., Miller v. City of Tacoma, 61 Wash. 2d 374, 384, 378 P.2d
464, 470 (1963). For a discussion of how the Miller court treated the question of public
use, see Comment, Inverse Condemnation in Washington State: A Survey of Judicial
History Defining Public Rights in Private Property, 16 GONz. L. REv. 385 (1981).
For better or worse, Miller effectively emasculated portions of the state consti-
tution. In holding that legislative determinations are "entitled to great
weight," and in proceeding to give such declarations not only great, but conclu-
sive weight absent a showing of irrationality, it would appear that the court
resolved that the constitutional prescription requiring independent judicial
appraisal of public use "without regard to any legislative assertion" was no
longer controlling.
Id. at 393-94 (footnotes omitted).
A recent decision, however, indicates that Washington courts might be less deferen-
tial to condemnors' public use assertions. In re City of Seattle, 96 Wash. 2d 616, 638
P.2d 549 (1981).
The acquisition of land through eminent domain proceedings must be for
a public use. Under the constitutional provision, the question whether a pro-
posed acquisition is for such a use is a judicial question, although a legislative
determination will be accorded great weight. Here, there has been no legisla-
tive pronouncement on the subject. Still the declaration of the City Council to
the effect that the project was required for the health, safety, convenience, and
welfare of the public and that the property to be acquired was for a public use
is also entitled to respect. However, the evidence which was presented to the
trial court did not substantiate the city's declaration.
Id. at 624-25, 638 P.2d at 554-55.
This case indicates that, at least, "legislative" determinations of public use are no
longer entitled to the conclusive weight they have traditionally enjoyed. After Puget,
private determinations of public use enjoy no weight at all but must be demonstrated by
a preponderance of the evidence. This is appropriate not only because of the constitu-
tional mandate, but because corporate accountability has historically been lacking in
eminent domain actions. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
35. See supra notes 15, 31.
36. Puget, 28 Wash. App. at 616, 625 P.2d at 723.
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court was fully capable of making a determination based on the
weight of the evidence. PPL's determination of necessity was
entitled to consideration as expert testimony rather than as a
conclusive presumption. The court of appeals, therefore, prop-
erly remanded the case for findings on whether PPL demon-
strated public use and necessity by a preponderance of the
evidence. 7
Although the Puget court correctly rejected the arbitrary
and capricious standard of review, the court based its reasoning
on an unusual and inadequately explained application of due
process principles.5 8 The court suggested that deferential review
of PPL's preliminary determinations violated due process
because there was no prior opportunity for the Jauchs to be
heard.
The Puget court cites two Washington cases for its due pro-
cess holdings.8 9 These impoundment and seizure cases both
apply procedural due process principles derived from the four-
teenth amendment of the federal Constitution. Generally, due
process requires a meaningful hearing appropriate to the circum-
stances prior to any significant deprivation of property.40 When
it invoked due process principles derived from criminal proce-
dure cases, however, the Puget court failed to recognize that
eminent domain is a unique area of the law.
Eminent domain case law is uniform in holding that due
process does not require a hearing on the issue of necessity.4'1
37. Id. at 620, 625 P.2d at 725.
38. The court stated:
The decision of PPL, a non-governmental agency, to exercise its power of
eminent domain was made privately. There can be no meaningful review of its
action when judicial scrutiny is limited by the arbitrary and capricious stand-
ard. Clothing the processes of such a private corporation with the mantle of
the legislative process, without the semblance of notice and opportunity to be
heard, does not conform to our concept of due process.
Id. at 618, 625 P.2d at 725.
39. Everett v. Slade, 83 Wash. 2d 80, 515 P.2d 1295 (1973); Reilly v. State, 18 Wash.
App. 245, 566 P.2d 1283 (1977).
40. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Arm-
strong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306 (1950).
41. Rindge Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923); Bragg v. Weaver, 251
U.S. 57 (1919). See also 1 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 4.11(1) (rev. 3d ed. 1981):
The real reason of the rule is simple enough; the courts have no power to revise
any enactment of the legislature unless it violates some clause of the constitu-
tion. The constitutions of the great majority of the states contain no provision
prohibiting the taking of land for public use except for necessary or economi-
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Determination of necessity is a legislative decision"" and proce-
dural due process principles are inapplicable to legislative acts
or decisions.'3 Because courts have not traditionally distin-
guished between public and private condemning entities," no
precedent supports a due process analysis based on the con-
demnor's identity."'
The Puget court distinguished between public and private
cally expedient undertakings, or unless the work can be done in no other way,
nor was it the practice when the state constitutions were adopted to require a
judicial hearing upon the question of necessity in eminent domain cases, so
that it can be plausibly argued that such a hearing is essential to due process
of law.
42. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
43. The Supreme Court indicated that procedural due process principles were inap-
plicable to legislative questions in eminent domain proceedings in Bragg v. Weaver, 251
U.S. 57 (1919).
Where the intended use is public, the necessity and expediency of the tak-
ing may be determined by such mode as the State may designate. They are
legislative questions, no matter who may be charged with their decision, and a
hearing thereon is not essential to due process in the sense of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Id. at 58.
44. Bragg is a good example of how courts indiscriminately label the necessity for a
particular condemnation as a legislative decision. The condemnor in Bragg was a govern-
mental entity, but the court emphasized that necessity is always a legislative question.
Id.
45. There is one tenuous indication that such an analysis may be appropriate. In
Joiner v. City of Dallas, 380 F. Supp. 754 (N.D. Tex) (construing Tsx. Rav. Civ. STAT.
ANN. arts. 3264-71 (Vernon 1974)), aff'd mem., 419 U.S. 1042 (1974), the Supreme Court
summarily affirmed a district court decision sustaining the constitutionality of a Texas
eminent domain statute. In Joiner, the condemnee contended that concepts of due pro-
cess had expanded significantly in favor of property owners in recent years and that the
procedural safeguards articulated in Bragg, 251 U.S. at 57, were inadequate under a
"modern" due process analysis. Based on this reasoning, the condemnee challenged the
Texas statute because it did not provide a hearing on the issue of necessity. However,
the court distinguished eminent domain cases from creditors' rights cases, on the basis
that eminent domain is pursued for a public purpose, whereas creditors generally have a
selfish interest in the outcome of the litigation. Accordingly, the district court stated:
"[W]e believe the power of eminent domain to be unique and distinct from any alleged
right of possession arising from debtor-creditor relationships and decline to apply the
due process standard created by Sniadach and its progeny to the sovereign power."
Joiner, 380 F. Supp. at 774.
The condemnor in Joiner was a municipality, however, and the court indicated in a
footnote that the same analysis might not apply to private delegees of the sovereign
power. The court said:
In the case at bar, the condemnor is a municipal corporation explicitly
delegated the power of eminent domain by the legislature under Article 608/e.
We do not have an allegation that the power of eminent domain has been dele-
gated to a private corporation which has an interest in the condemnation
proceeding.
Id. at 774 n.20.
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condemnors and recognized that additional procedural protec-
tion is appropriate when the condemnor is a private corporation.
Since a private corporation is not a public representative and
lacks public accountability, PPL's determination that the Jauch
property was necessary was not functionally a legislative deci-
sion.46 The decision was, however, a substantial step towards
depriving the Jauchs of the unencumbered use of their property.
Therefore, if properly invoked, procedural due process may con-
ceivably require judicial supervision to insure that the determi-
nation of necessity is made on a principled basis.'7
The arbitrary and capricious standard of review with its
strong presumption of validity in favor of the condemnor does
not afford landowners much procedural protection when the
condemnor is a private corporation.48 A preponderance of the
evidence burden of proof, on the other hand, provides a more
meaningful public use and necessity hearing.
Although the Puget court's due process analysis provides
needed protection to condemnees, the decision could have been
based on Washington's eminent domain statutes.4 Avoiding the
difficulties of the constitutional issue would have been prudent
for several reasons. The Puget court did not state which consti-
tution it was relying on for its due process holding. If the court
was applying federal constitutional due process, its analysis may
conflict with United States Supreme Court cases holding that
due process does not require a hearing on the issue of neces-
sity."e The court might have relied on the state constitution's
due process clause,8 1 or even common law notions of due pro-
46. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
47. Washington courts have indicated a willingness to view some land use decisions
functionally rather than formally. Zoning decisions are traditionally labeled legislative,
and consequently only reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard. In Smith v.
Skagit County, 75 Wash. 2d 715, 453 P.2d 832 (1969), the court applied procedural due
process principles to a rezone decision because hearings were statutorily required.
In other cases the courts have recognized that rezone decisions, as opposed to the
original enactment of a zoning scheme, are more adjudicatory than legislative in nature,
and have applied a strict standard of substantive review. Cathcart-Maltby-Clearview
Community Council v. Snohomish County, 96 Wash. 2d 201, 634 P.2d 853 (1981); Park-
ridge v. City of Seattle, 89 Wash. 2d 454, 573 P.2d 359 (1978).
48. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
49. See supra notes 4, 9.
50. See supra note 41.
51. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3 provides: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law."
Indeed, there is authority for the proposition that state courts can interpret state
constitutional provisions as more protective of individual rights than parallel federal pro-
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cess,5 ' but it did not have the benefit of authority for these posi-
tions either. In addition, traditional jurisprudential theory rec-
ognizes a preference for resolving issues on more narrow
statutory grounds because of the precedential effect broad con-
stitutional holdings may have.
The court could have avoided the constitutional question by
engaging in a comprehensive analysis of Washington eminent
domain procedural statutes. The Washington legislature appar-
ently recognized the differences between public and private con-
demning entities and provided separate and distinct procedures
for each entity authorized to exercise the power of eminent
domain. The corporate eminent domain statute explicitly
requires proof that the contemplated use is a public use, that
the project is in furtherance of the public interest, and that the
particular property sought is necessary." In contrast, the proce-
dural statutes for public entities generally only require compe-
tent proof that the acquisition is sought for a public use.55 These
statutes do not require proof that the particular property is nec-
essary" for the contemplated use. The legislature indicated,
visions. Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Environmental Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635
P.2d 108 (1981); State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980). The Simpson
court noted that this is particularly appropriate where the state provision differs from
the federal provision. Id. at 177, 622 P.2d at 1203. However, the federal and Washington
state due process clauses are virtually identical.
52. Common law procedural due process has been relied upon by Washington courts
in formulating "the appearance of fairness" doctrine which requires unbiased legislative
decisions and fair hearings in land-use proceedings. See, e.g., City of Bellevue v. Bound-
ary Review Bd., 90 Wash. 2d 856, 863, 586 P.2d 470, 475 (1978).
53. State v. Hall, 95 Wash. 2d 536, 539, 627 P.2d 101, 103 (1981) ("A reviewing court
should not pass on constitutional issues unless absolutely necessary to the determination
of the case."); City of Kirkland v. Steen, 68 Wash. 2d 804, 809, 416 P.2d 80, 83 (1966)
("It is a basic rule of judicial restraint that the issue of the constitutionality of a statute
will not be passed upon if the case can be decided without reaching that issue.").
54. WASH. Rv. CODE § 8.20.070 (1981). See supra note 4.
55. The statute giving eminent domain to school districts is the only other statute
that explicitly requires a showing of necessity. WASH. REV. CODE § 8.16.050 (1981).
56. The word "necessity" does not even appear in the statutes for county or munici-
pal eminent domain. See supra note 9. The statute for state condemnations does contain
the word "necessary." The wording of the statute, when read closely, however, only
requires that the use is necessarily a public use. "[Ilf the court.. . is further satisfied by
competent proof that the contemplated use for which the lands, real estate, premises or
other property are sought to be appropriated is really necessary for the public use of the
state .... WASH. REV. CODE § 8.04.070 (1981) (emphasis added). WASH. REv. CODE §
8.04.070 (1981) sets out the contents of a judicial decree in state condemnations. The
statute further supports the conclusion that the legislature's concern was only that the
use was necessarily a public use. The statute states: "It is hereby ordered, adjudged, and
decreed: 1. That the contemplated use for which the lands, premises, and other property
Corporate Eminent Domain
therefore, that private corporations should not be granted the
same discretion as public entities, and that private eminent
domain actions6" are only justified when the condemnor proves
that both the project and the particular property are necessary.
The Washington courts have failed to recognize the crucial
differences between the statutes. The Washington Supreme
Court began confusing the eminent domain procedural statutes
in State ex rel. Bremerton Bridge Co. v. Superior Court." The
Bremerton court mistakenly applied the requirements of the
corporate procedural statute to a state eminent domain proceed-
ing. The court stated that "three prerequisites to an adjudica-
tion of public use are recognized: (1) that the use is really a pub-
lic use; (2) that the public interest requires it; and (3) that the
property appropriated is necessary for the purpose."5' But the
statute governing state condemnations requires only that the use
is necessarily a public use.60 The Bremerton court, by relying on
case law construing the statute for corporations, 1 imposed addi-
tional requirements on a governmental condemnor.
Washington courts have carelessly applied the requirements
of the corporate condemnation statute to governmental condem-
nations ever since Bremerton. The three-pronged analysis now
extends to state,"0 county,6" municipal," and school district emi-
hereinafter described are sought to be appropriated herein is really and necessarily a
public use of the state of Washington ..... " Id. (emphasis added).
57. The statute for corporate condemnation includes the procedure for condemning
private ways of necessity as well. WASH. Ray. CODE § 8.20.070 (1981). See supra note 4.
Perhaps this is an indication that the legislature determined that there is an element of
private use in corporate condemnations which would require a strong showing of neces-
sity in order to be justified.
58. 194 Wash. 7, 76 P.2d 990 (1938).
59. Id. at 18, 76 P.2d at 995.
60. See supra note 56.
61. The Bremerton court cited two earlier cases involving condemnations by private
corporations. State ex rel. Oregon-Washington Ry. & Nay. Co. v. Superior Court, 155
Wash. 651, 286 P. 33 (1930); State ex rel. Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Superior
Court, 133 Wash. 308, 233 P. 651 (1925).
62. State ex rel. Sternoff v. Superior Court, 52 Wash. 2d 282, 290, 325 P.2d 300, 305-
06 (1958) (most often cited as authority for three-pronged analysis); State v. Bank of
California, 5 Wash. App. 861, 864, 491 P.2d 697, 699 (1971).
The State v. Bank of California court recognized the confusion in a footnote and
said:
There appears to be some confusion in the cases as to whether the leading case
of State ex rel. Sternoff v. Superior Court, supra, was interpreting RCW
8.20.070, relating to condemnation by corporations . . . . or RCW 8.04.070,
relating to condemnations by the state.... RCW 8.04.070 is the applicable
statute in our case.
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nent domain actions. The courts, however, are not scrutinizing
the actions of public entities more carefully than they are
required to by statute.65 Although the courts purport to examine
the necessity of the particular property, they defer to the con-
demnor's determination in the absence of fraud." The addi-
tional requirements of the statute governing corporate eminent
domain have, therefore, become meaningless. The arbitrary and
capricious standard of review, though, is adequate for govern-
mental condemnors' determinations of necessity because the
public entity statutes do not contain explicit requirements of
necessity.
Deference to the condemnor's determinations of necessity,
appropriate in governmental condemnations, should not be car-
ried over to proper applications of the corporate eminent
domain statute. Indeed, the differences between the statutes
governing public and private eminent domain provide a sound
basis for the Puget court's holding that a private condemnor
must prove public use and necessity. The statute requires that
the trial court be satisfied by competent proof that the contem-
plated use is a public use, that the public interest requires the
project, and that the particular property is necessary. The legis-
lature made these judicial questions by including them in the
statute. Under the statute, PPL must prove that the transmis-
sion of electrical power is a public use, 7 that the public interest
Even though the 3-pronged test in State ex rel. Sternoff v. Superior
Court, supra, more closely resembles the language of RCW 8.20.070, we feel
the procedural determinations enunciated in that case apply to all authorities
empowered to exercise eminent domain. Most cases have cited the three
requirements without distinguishing between the statutes.
Id. at 864-65 n.3, 491 P.2d at 699 n.3 (citations omitted).
The court justifies application of the three-part test to governmental condemnations
by simply citing cases that have failed to properly distinguish between the statutes. The
court seems to have said that there has been confusion, but the confusion is proper
because the result is proper. This reasoning only perpetuated the poor statutory con-
struction that contributed to the Puget court's ambiguous analysis.
63. King County v. Theilman, 59 Wash. 2d 586, 593, 369 P.2d 503, 506 (1962).
64. City of Des Moines v. Hemenway, 73 Wash. 2d 130, 138, 437 P.2d 171, 176
(1968).
65. State ex rel. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10 v. Stojack, 53 Wash. 2d 55, 330 P.2d
567 (1958).
66. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
67. It is well established that the transmission of electrical power is a public use.
See, e.g., P.U.D. No. 1 v. Washington Water Power Co., 43 Wash. 2d 639, 643, 262 P.2d
976, 979 (1953); State ex reL. Washington Water Power Co. v. Superior Court, 8 Wash. 2d
122, 133, 111 P.2d 577, 582 (1941).
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required PPL to undertake the project, and that the Jauch
property in particular was necessary for the project. Instead of
basing its decision on "notions of due process," the Puget court
could have recognized the differences between the eminent
domain statutes and grounded its decision in the statute pro-
vided by the legislature.
The Washington Court of Appeals, in In re Puget Sound
Power and Light Co., recognized that the legislative nature of
condemnors' eminent domain decisions is the basis for judicial
deference to preliminary determinations of public use and neces-
sity. A legislative decision, however, presumes not only a discre-
tionary policy choice, but a decisionmaking body responsive to
the public's concerns. A private corporation's condemnation
decisions, therefore, cannot be characterized as legislative. Strict
judicial supervision is appropriate because a private corporation
is not accountable to the public for its exercises of eminent
domain power.
Additionally, deferential judicial review is inappropriate
when there is no record compiled for review prior to superior
court proceedings. The court, therefore, properly imposed a pre-
ponderance of the evidence burden of proof on private corpora-
tions in eminent domain proceedings. The court could have
avoided the due process issue by grounding its decision in the
procedural statute governing corporate condemnation. Admit-
tedly, the court would have had to deal with a history of misin-
terpretation of the eminent domain statutes. Considering the
court's ambiguous due process analysis, however, a statutory
approach that finally recognized the differences between the
statutes would have been a wiser course.
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